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Abstract 
 
The paper aims at elaborating on pricing and business models for forthcoming innovative ITS 
devices, limiting its scope in particular to in-vehicle driving assistance systems and suggesting 
the various possible innovation and pricing strategies with theoretical discussions.  
 
The methodology is based on a comprehensive literature review of the major contributions made 
by the fields of managerial economics and management sciences to the study of pricing 
strategies and practices and, in particular, the pricing of innovative goods or services, in order to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the various schools of thought. The paper also gathers 
and analyzes the available data on two innovative navigation and safety devices for cars, namely 
ABS (Anti-Lock Braking System) and navigation systems, in order to put forward an initial 
interpretation. 
 
It concludes that there is no formula or even a vague method for determining “acceptable” price 
levels or “trigger points”. There are two options, i.e. disruptive innovation which is by essence 
very risky and incremental innovation with each major model renewal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The pricing of common goods and services is one of the key factors governing microeconomic 
models of competition, monopoly and oligopoly. As a result, there is a vast amount of theoretical 
literature on the topic. The same cannot be said for the pricing of innovative goods and services. 
In all likelihood, this is because the necessary conditions do not yet exist: this refers in particular 
to the existence of the market itself—in other words, the conjunction of supply and demand. In 
addition, the dominant economic theory considers innovation a source of cost savings, rather 
than the creator of brand new markets. The most recent research by transport economists relates 
to the price adjustment policies that are applied to transport in an attempt to better take into 
account its “real” costs, that is to say, the social costs of the different forms of transport 
(European Commission, 2001). However, the existing literature does not even broach the subject 
of pricing for innovative goods. 
 
The aim of this article is threefold: 
 
• Firstly, to review the existing economic and management sciences literature on the topic of 
price determination and, in particular, the pricing of new goods and services. The objective 
here will be to identify the strengths, weaknesses, contributions and failings of the different 
fields and the main schools of thought; 
 
• Secondly, to gather and analyze the available pricing and sales information concerning two 
innovative navigational and safety aids for cars—ABS (Anti-Lock Braking System) and 
navigation systems—and to build up an initial interpretation of this data. 
 
• Thirdly, to elaborate hypotheses and scenarios on pricing and business models for the 
forthcoming ITS (Intelligent Transportation Systems) devices, focusing in particular on in-
vehicle driving assistance systems. 
 
 
1. MICROECONOMIC PRICE THEORY  
 
1.1. Market prices 
 
In the market, whatever its form, price is one of the arithmetic variables of unit profit
1
, together 
with average cost. While average cost is a techno-economic variable that is managed by each 
company internally in order to determine the minimum price below which the firm will decline 
to offer its product, price also depends on the acceptance level of buyers, which governs the 
maximum price beyond which the consumer will refuse to purchase the good.  
 
The two extremes of market economics—pure perfect competition and monopoly—are very 
different from a price determination point of view. In a competitive situation, the market does 
indeed determine the price: the company is the “price taker” at a point of equilibrium between 
the price consumers are prepared to pay and the marginal cost above the minimum average price.  
 
                                               
1
 pi = p-AC. 
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In a monopoly situation, the supplier sets the price. The company is the “price maker” of a 
quantity that enables marginal revenue and marginal cost (above the average price) to be 
balanced, a quantity that, in turn, determines the price that consumers are then prepared to pay. 
However, the company remains dependent on the state of demand and, in particular, the price 
elasticity of demand. 
 
In other situations of imperfect competition—oligopoly, dominant firm—there is no simple 
model for price determination. This is a gray area of strategic games and decisions.  
 
Situations of imperfect competition that are not strictly monopolistic are in a clear majority. 
Price determination is therefore a highly strategic issue that is dependent on anticipation and on 
certain choices that follow no stable economic model. 
 
In practice, when the company is in a position to set its price, the most commonly employed 
method is that which involves adding together cost and expected profit
2
. When the market is 
competitive, the price is determined by the market. The company therefore has a target price, 
based on which it sets an ad hoc cost estimate for an expected average profit. It then designs the 
product or service according to this “imposed” cost.  
 
1.2. The price of innovation 
 
The economic theory of innovation, first proposed by Schumpeter (1912), allows the innovating 
company to enjoy a temporary monopoly situation, because, by definition, it is alone in the 
newly-created market. Therefore, in this case the company is the “price maker” until the moment 
imitators enter the market, attracted by the profits achieved by the innovator (Chanaron, 1990). 
 
There are three alternative ways of setting the price of an innovation: 
 
1. The monopolist innovator’s price or “premium pricing”, which is based on high costs and 
the acceptability of a cost premium on the new good. This is common practice in the car 
industry, where innovations are introduced at the top of the line. This is also the dominant 
practice in pharmaceuticals and in the electronic component (Intel Pentium) and software 
industries. This pricing strategy is sometimes termed “cream skimming pricing” insofar as in 
certain high-technology markets, there are always consumers who are prepared to pay a 
premium for novelty—the “early adopters”
3
; 
 
In the case of export markets, different prices can be set, most notably as a function of 
exchange rate differences (Khalaf, Kichian, 2000), or varying price or income elasticities. 
 
Glaxo’s launch of the anti-ulcer drug Zantac, in 1983, is one of the best-known examples of 
successful “premium pricing”. For patients, the greater perceived value of Zantac compared 
with Tagamet by SmithKline Beecham, the world leader in the segment at the time, meant a 
more convenient dosing schedule, fewer side effects and no drug contraindications. Glaxo 
decided to charge a 50% premium instead of pricing at parity or below (“follower pricing”). 
In four years, Zantac became the world market leader. 
 
                                               
2
 Cost-plus pricing. 
3
 This strategy can also be justified by the need to recoup R&D costs from initial sales. 
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2. Market pricing or competitive pricing, which takes into account the option to choose 
alternatives to the innovative product or service—as well as balancing supply and demand—
while allowing for manufacturers’ cost constraints and the economic satisfaction (well-being) 
of consumers; 
 
One of the possible variants of market pricing is the strategy known as “value pricing”. This 
involves banishing any form of price promotion (e.g. discounts, coupons), while increasing 
advertising costs and passing them on to the consumer “normally”. According to Ailawadi, 
Lehmann and Neslin (2001), this strategy was successfully applied by Procter & Gamble as 
of 1991
4
.  
 
3. The loss-leader price, which in its extreme form, can mean that the product is free or 
practically free. This takes into account the need to create demand for a new consumer 
product from scratch or the fact that the product has to compete against a dominant 
alternative standard or technology and/or that its use can generate other sources of revenue: 
Minitel, mobile telephony, the Linux operating system
5
, Netscape source code, Encyclopedia 
Britannica
6
, Internet browsing.  
 
Klemperer (1995) introduced an alternative to the “premium pricing” strategy that takes into 
account the notion of diffusion over time. This is the limit price strategy that allows an 
innovative company that is still alone in its market and has the potential to generate “switching 
costs”
7
 to “capture” the largest possible market share in order to minimize the size of the 
remaining market, i.e. consumers who are not loyal to the brand, when new companies enter the 
market.  
 
Holden and Nagle (1998) put forward the notion of “kamikaze pricing” to describe the 
penetration strategies that employ loss-leader prices for such long periods of time that they result 
in situations in which none of the competitors succeed in obtaining acceptable returns on 
investments. Penetration pricing strategies are viable if the product or service is sold at its true 
value
8
. 
 
The body of management science literature on the subject of price setting has been extended 
considerably with the emergence of online business
9
. Indeed, the pricing of online services is a 
major strategic issue for banks, insurance companies, auctioneers. In addition, as Pourquery 
(2001) points out, the overriding attitude of consumers to pricing has been profoundly altered by 
the Internet, which has enriched the culture of consumers with the concept of auctions and the 
idea that prices can change very quickly. The Internet also offers users the option of 
                                               
4
 Between 1990 and 1996, purchasing frequency dropped by 15.7% and discount coupon usage fell by 54.3%. As a 
result, the average price paid by consumers increased by around 20%. 
5
 On August 25, 1991, Linus Torvalds posted a message on comp.os.minix stating that the source code of his minix 
system would be free: “Hello everybody out there using minix. I'm doing a (free) operating system (just a hobby, 
won't be big and professional … for 386(486) AT clones. This has been brewing since April, and is starting to get 
ready”. 
6
 Previously sold for $1,500, now partially available online free of charge.  
7
 The cost incurred by consumers when changing suppliers.  
8
 The authors (of the Strategic Pricing Group) cite Lexus (Toyota), which was launched in the United States at a 
higher price than standard vehicles but still undercut Mercedes Benz and BMW prices. 
9
 The special report that appeared in the Expansion Management Review in December 2001, for example. 
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instantaneously comparing the prices of different suppliers (PriceSearch.com) and of modifying 
any online price list (Schindehutte and Morris, 2001). 
 
In practice, according to Smith and Nagle (1994), the price set for a new product or service is 
often the result of a “political” decision which emanates from the confrontation between strict 
accounting requirements—the price needs to be high enough to cover development and 
production costs—and a vision based more on marketing—the price must be low enough for the 
commodity to sell.  
 
According to management sciences, price is one of a number of strategic variables. It is also an 
extraordinarily complex issue (Cressmann, 2001) that must take into account consumer 
expectations (marketing) and the company’s development strategy. Price is a signal sent by a 
company to its customers that reflects its analysis of the perceived value of a product.  
 
 
2. PRICE AND DEMAND 
 
Economic theories on demand are not as well-developed as those on the subject of supply. This 
is probably because it is extremely difficult to apprehend the immense variety of consumer 
behaviors, attitudes, motivations, choice criteria. In terms of managerial approaches, marketing 
is obviously the field that is supposed to allow these types of questions to be analyzed. But there 
is still a fair way to go before a field that works more like a cookbook than anything else 
becomes a bona fide scientific discipline.  
 
Managerial approaches emphasize the strategic side of price: price represents the value the 
consumer expects to obtain from the product or service they have acquired; it varies over time 
and space; it can be diversified through different models and versions
10
; it is visible and 
indicative of value, image, quality; it is virtual because it is subject to modification (Schindehutte 
and Morris, 2001). On the automotive market, as confirmed by a survey carried out early 2005 
by ACNielsen with 14,000 consumers on Internet
11
, globally, the price is unanimously the most 
important factor in choice of car. Surprisingly, the engine size and the environmentally friendly 
achievements are regarded the least important features when it comes to buying a car.  
 
2.1. Direct demand and derived demand 
 
In the automotive world, the demand for active and passive safety systems and driver aids is 
derived from the demand for new vehicles with so-called “factory-fitted” equipment (as standard 
or as an optional extra) or from the demand for accessories for so-called “aftermarket” 
equipment. 
 
There are therefore two price determination methods: 
 
• The double “loop”, which combines the price charged by the equipment manufacturer to the 
car manufacturer with the price charged by the car manufacturer to the consumer, to which 
distribution costs and margins have been added; 
 
                                               
10
 “Versioning”. 
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 See http://www2.acnielsen.com/news/20050404_eu.shtml. 
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• The single “loop”, which is comprised of the price charged by the equipment manufacturer to 
the consumer, to which distribution costs and margins have been added. 
 
2.2. Price of the product and price of complementary goods 
 
In the automotive sector, there are obvious cross-elasticities with complementary goods. In the 
area of driving aids, the following immediately spring to mind: Firstly, the cost of updating 
software and boards; and secondly, connections to real-time information-update networks. 
 
Chanaron (2001) notes that one of the problems faced by Toyota in marketing its Monet 
navigation systems, which are connected to the Internet, remains the pricing of the subscription 
to the network, as well as the consumer perception of adding another connection to the list of 
those already installed (e.g. fixed telephone, cell phone, television). 
 
Indeed, in early 2002, the France CD-ROM for the Clarion Dayton navigation system was being 
sold for €181, for use with aftermarket systems that were available for between €1,310 and 
€2,440. The France Atlas CD-ROM (for the Clarion NVS613 system, which was sold at a 
recommended retail price of €1,980) was available for €152. This additional cost of almost 10% 
of the original purchase price is incurred by the user at least once a year. 
 
2.3. Purchase price and cost of usage 
 
One of the peculiarities of the car industry is that different levels of cost are incurred by the 
user/consumer. Indeed, because they are durable goods, cars inevitably lead to the consumption 
of many other goods and services that are inherent to their ownership and use. 
 
Table 1. The cost of motoring 
 
Acquisition Possession Use 
• Price of the vehicle and 
options 
• Vehicle registration 
• Insurance 
• Tax (company cars) 
 
• Fuel 
• Fuel tax 
• Tolls and fees (highways 
and parking) 
• Maintenance and repair 
costs 
 
These different cost items are obviously interrelated. Their sensitivity to price and tax variations 
has been highlighted on numerous occasions (in particular, those relating to taxation, Chanaron, 
Kostopoulou, 1995a, 1995b). Negative cross-price elasticities are especially high for motor 
vehicles, which have an extendible physical lifecycle and a replacement date that is easy to alter, 
notably by switching from a new to a used vehicle and vice versa. 
 
When an apparently significant innovation emerges in the fields of vehicle safety equipment or 
energy consumption and the product is expected to lead to the implementation of incentives or 
regulations, specialists are quick to suggest “compensating” for any resulting surcharges by 
introducing tax breaks or rebates. Similarly, the additional cost of safety equipment could be 
counterbalanced by a drop in insurance premiums or certain taxes. 
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2.4. Threshold effects 
 
The field of managerial economics, in its analysis of price determination, has identified certain 
threshold effects; in other words, price levels that trigger the emergence of a market or a 
significant change in the volume of demand. Marketing often attempts to pinpoint such 
thresholds through surveys of representative samples, which allow an acceptance threshold to be 
assessed. 
 
According to the empirical studies conducted by Sahay (2000), in industrialized nations, a new 
product stands a greater chance of taking off if its price remains below the €230 threshold. In the 
opinion of Chanaron (2001), Toyota has estimated the psychological threshold for the price of 
first-generation navigation systems at around €350-400. For second-generation systems, with 
real-time updates, a subscription fee is added to the basic price of the equipment. 
 
2.5. Behavior 
 
Economists have always struggled to fully comprehend behavior, in particular because of its 
extreme diversity and tendency to vary over time and space, but also as a result of measurement 
difficulties, even when making approximations. The debate on the concept of value rages on! 
 
Management sciences, on the other hand, have made significant progress, most notably by 
defining several main categories of consumers according to the speed with which they adopt 
technological innovations and, therefore, the price level they are likely to accept.  
 
The sensitivity to market price grows over time, with innovators obviously being prepared to 
accept high launch prices.  
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Figure 1. Price and Timing of Adoption 
 
2.6. “Lock-in” costs 
 
In many new information and communication technology applications, user/consumers can often 
find themselves in a “lock-in” situation; in other words, trapped as a result of their initial 
decision and forced to continue buying from the original equipment or software manufacturer, 
unless they are prepared to make a substantial investment in order to change suppliers 
(“switching cost”).  
 
From a product offering point of view, the aim is to encourage consumer loyalty and even to 
keep customers against their will or their best interests
12
. According to Klemperer (1987; 1995), 
consumers or users can be trapped in a number of ways: by the transaction costs that are inherent 
to the renegotiation or termination of a supply contract; by the training cost involved in 
switching from a familiar product or service to a new product or service; by artificial transfer 
costs: loyalty agreements (online updates), discounts, bonuses, contracts; by the need for the old 
and new product or service to be technologically compatible; by uncertainties over the quality 
and performance of the new product; by the psychological cost of switching to a new and 
unfamiliar product or service. 
 
Incidentally, many suppliers of software, updates, and performance or functional upgrades play 
on these transfer costs by charging high prices, backed up by the possibly justifiable claim that 
they need to recoup their initial investment, including R&D costs (Pei-Yu, Hitt, 2001). 
According to Pei-Yu and Hitt (2001), these companies can then either reduce competition 
through pricing, or create a monopoly situation
13
 and thus enjoy substantial economic rent.  
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 Customer retention. 
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 By assuming a “first mover” position. 
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3. MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICE  
 
Economic theory has developed reference models for markets with a competitive and 
monopolistic structure. However, it is far less well-equipped to deal with other situations of 
imperfect competition, in particular oligopolistic markets, which are, in fact, in a majority. 
Optimization subject to constraints does not cater for such situations, which over the years have 
become a subject of predilection for game theory and experimental economics. 
 
In the automotive sector (de Banville, Chanaron, 1991), the oligopolistic structure of both 
vehicle production (Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs) and equipment manufacturing 
precludes strictly monopolistic practices, especially since national markets were opened to 
competition. It can even be said to constitute a considerable barrier to disruptive innovation 
(Chanaron, 1998).  
 
However, when one of the market players finds itself, at least temporarily, in a unique position as 
a result of an innovation, as Bosch did with ABS at the end of the seventies and again with the 
common-rail direct injection diesel engine in the late nineties, the prices charged allow it to 
enjoy monopolistic rents. 
 
Subsequently, Schumpeter’s model for the diffusion of innovation through imitation takes root 
very quickly, with the potential for high profits attracting new entrants and the potential for 
lower prices prompting car manufacturers, in their role as customers, to call for further 
competitors to enter the market. It is thanks to this phenomenon that Siemens, Denso, TRW, 
Delphi and Visteon now manufacture common-rail direct injection diesel systems, with Peugeot 
agreeing to share its knowledge base with Siemens, in order to counter the market power wielded 
by Bosch. 
 
 
4. THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH TO PRICING POLICY 
 
The about-turn made by Microsoft barely a month after it launched the Xbox games console, 
which saw its price drop by 37.5% at the end of April 2002, illustrates the difficulties faced by 
companies. In his analysis of pricing policy, Briard (2002) describes its status as marketing’s 
poor relation. 
 
Price is the result of a consensus between functional approaches and interests that are often 
contradictory: 
 
The Microsoft case clearly shows that because of the near-monopolistic pricing model Microsoft 
enjoys with its software, the firm’s strategists may have been blinded by their success and caught 
out by the competitive structure of the console market. The case also pinpoints that untimely 
price changes can challenge the loyalty of early buyers, whose purchase will have been suddenly 
devalued and that analysts must fine-tune their optimal price determination model and must do 
so long before the new product is launched. Finally, the case shows that the different mindsets 
governing the various corporate divisions must be coordinated and probably require the 
appointment of a chief economist to reconcile the information available with the company’s 
targets. 
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Figure 2. A Multi-rationale Managerial Decision Making Process 
 
 
5. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 
 
Beyond their historical and educational value, case studies allow important lessons to be learned 
that can be applied to future innovations. Indeed, ABS (Anti-Lock Braking System) and 
navigation systems are two significant examples of components that enhance the safety and use 
of vehicles and which have followed exemplary innovation and diffusion processes. 
 
5.1. ABS systems 
 
ABS is a relatively recent example of an innovative, electronics-based active safety feature that 
has been on the market long enough for us to be able to identify and analyze the general trends 
that affect it. 
 
Developed in the seventies and sold as an optional extra and later as standard equipment at the 
beginning of the eighties, essentially by German manufacturers of luxury automobiles, ABS can 
now be considered widespread, despite not yet being available on certain bottom-of-the-line 
models (or makes) and despite continued debate in the United States over its true value in terms 
of performance. 
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Figure 3. ABS Equipment Rate (in % of models available on the Swiss market 
 
It has therefore taken over twenty years for the widespread inclusion of ABS as standard to 
become a reality in Europe. In 2001, less than 4% of models did not offer ABS as standard or as 
an option.  
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Figure 4. Optional Price of ABS System on the Swiss Market 
 
How prices have progressed over time is obviously difficult to evaluate. In the absence of data 
from ABS system manufacturers, and because ABS is included in the list price of new vehicles, 
it is only possible to consider the price of optional ABS. The general trend observed fits exactly 
into the standard diffusion model. In fifteen years, prices halved, and have now stabilized. In 
 12 
2001, optional ABS represented around 5 to 6% of the vehicle’s sale price. In 1985, the figure 
was around 9 to 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Synchronized Phenomena 
 
5.2. Navigation systems 
 
Satellite navigation systems were launched much more recently—in the mid-nineties—but we 
already have considerable information on their production, sales and prices in Japan, where their 
commercial success is unquestionable.  
 
Prices for navigational aids vary greatly. At the end of 2001, these ranged from ¥300,000 
(€2,500) for a Pioneer system with a color monitor and DVD, for top of the line vehicles, to a 
loss-leader price of ¥58,000 (€500) for a Toyota system for compact vehicles. At the price 
charged for the Toyota system, the widespread fitting of such systems as standard equipment on 
all cars and light utility vehicles is foreseeable in the near future. The cost of updating the 
databases (CD-ROM or DVD) is considered to be marginal. 
 
VICS (Vehicle Information and Communication System), which are connected to the Internet 
and provide real-time updates of traffic data, as well as more general information, are currently 
sold at around €500-600, with an additional subscription fee. According to Chanaron and Orselli 
(2001), when Toyota launched its Monet system, it had no choice but to set a reduced price that 
fell below the breakeven point.  
 
In mid-February 2002, Nissan announced a March launch date for an integrated navigation 
system equipped with both an Internet connection and embedded mobile telephony. This would 
be fitted as standard to a new “compact” model for ¥50,000, or €430, compared with ¥100,000 
for a traditional navigation system. The annual subscription fee was set at ¥4,000, or €35, with 
Nissan planning to sell 50,000 of these vehicles in the first year. The price drop was staggering. 
-20,0
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This initiative prompted Toyota to launch its G-book in the second half of 2002 and led Honda to 
bring out a similar system at the end of 2002 in collaboration with NTT (Nippon Telegram and 
Telephone)
14
. 
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Figure 6. Sales of Navigation Systems in Japan 
 
It is obvious that navigation systems have been very popular only Japan. In the United States and 
Europe, they have been acquired only by top-of-the-range consumers buying luxury brands sucg 
as Audi, BMW and Mercedes-Benz. This is indeed due to the relatively high price of such 
devices in Europe and a low demanding market in the US and Europe since the traffic is not such 
a constraint than on the Japanese Pacific coastal connurbation. 
 
It is only since 2004 that prices are decreasing in Europe. But they still remain very high: 
 
Table 2. Some examples of prices for navigation systems in France in July 2004 
Unit: euro. 
Factory-fit Citroën Picasso 1,150 
Factory-fit Peugeot 407 1,270 
Factory-fit VW Golf 1,495 
Factory-fit Renault Megane 2,140 
Factory-fit Japan 600 
Main Street France Cheapest Website 750 
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6. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE ITS TECHNOLOGIES 
 
This section deals a specific part of “ITS”, namely in-vehicle driving assistance systems. 
Obviously ITS encompass much more than that, e.g. also systems for electronic toll collection, 
traffic management, and incident detection, and further research would be needed for extending 
or elaborating alternative options for the other ITS domains. 
 
This section is based on the following four assumptions: there are still some scientific and 
technical bottlenecks; the economic feasibility is still far from proven; the social acceptance of 
such devices is still questionable; there is an absolute requirement for a strong political and legal 
support. 
 
The future of vehicle driving assistance systems is very dependent on the bargaining power of 
the various stakeholders of the industry, i.e. the OEMs and their component suppliers, the 
customers and the various government agencies. 
 
For in-vehicle driving assistance devices, four pricing strategy seem to be envisageable: 
 
• Premium innovator’s or monopoly pricing as it happened for the ABS and navigation 
systems in the past: this model requires a low demand elascticity and no oligopolistic 
competition; 
• Competitive market pricing, i.e. at marginal manufacturing cost: this strategy is highly 
uncertain since acceptability and then demand are unknown due to the lack of product 
information; 
• Kamikase pricing; with an extreme limit to p=0 as Linux, this model is very risky since it 
aims a creating an entirely new market; 
• Welfare pricing. based on market pricing reduced by a public subsidy or any other 
financial incentive.  
 
6.1. Market acceptance 
 
There is indeed no published market research for in-vehicle driving assistance products so far. In 
the context of this project realised within for the French programme ARCOS 2003, a survey has 
been carried out on Internet with a representative panel of 558 persons. When asked to prioritize 
the key factors for road safety, 85% of them point the improvement of the drivers’ behavior, 8% 
the improvement of infrastructures and only 5% the improvement of vehicle equipment.  
 
Within 480 respondents, 64% declared to be ready to invest in safety. But only 17% admitted to 
have already invested in optional safety devices, and 60% recognized that Euro NCAP tests have 
no influence on their decision when purchasing a new car. 
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Probably, No
25%
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11%
Yes, Absolutely
24%
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40%
 
Figure 7. Investing in safety 
 
To the question “how much are you ready to spend?”, 15% of the 311 workable answers 
declared they would accept to pay more than €1,000. 
 
 
If Yes, How Much?
< 500€
42%
500 -1000€
43%
1000 - 1500€
10%
> 1500€
5%
 
Figure 8. Which level of investment in safety? 
 
In previous research (Chanaron & Kostopoulou 1995a; Chanaron, 2001), it has been indicated 
that psychological ceiling prices do exist in the automtive system, i.e. that the average customer 
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is usually fixing a limit to the price she/he is ready to pay for a particular good or service; and 
that several evidences from consulting organizations indicate a level of ceiling at €300-400. 
 
6.2. Business models 
 
It is possible that the only solution for in-vehicle driving assistance devices would be a mix of 
several generic business models: 
 
1. The subscription business model 
 
It is based on selling the service and up-date through subscription. Best examples are magazines. 
It provides a constant revenue stream but requires high marketing and tracking costs. The crucial 
remaining question: what about hardware pricing? 
 
2. The razor-blade business model 
 
It is based on cheap hardware with revenue from “consumable” or “associated services”. Best 
examples are mobile telephone, TV.. It has the same unresolved question: what about hardware 
pricing? 
 
3. Network effects business model 
 
It is based on the principle that a product-service has value only thanks to the number of existing 
customers. A technological standard should be imposed providing heavy switching costs and 
there is a risk of anti-competition practice. 
 
4. Dis-intermediation business model 
 
It aims at direct sale and management by the OEMs and sales by main street shops and DIY 
supermarkets. The key objective is to reduce transaction costs; 
 
5. Controlled obsolescence business model 
 
It is based on relatively cheap hardware with R&D and sales managed by software companies. A 
new generation is launched every two to four years: best example is indeed Microsoft. 
 
6. Collective business model 
 
All stakeholders join a non-profit association. The consortium defines and imposes a unique 
standard. It adopts a pricing-to-cost strategy. 
 
6.3. Competitive strategy 
 
There are two opposing options within the automotive system: a “technology-centered” vision 
which aims at designing a 100% smart and safe car; and a “business-centered” approach which 
adopts a step-by-step fitting of safety devices. 
 
Obviously, the OEMs and their component suppliers promote the second one, which is less risky 
and coherent with their interest (Chanaron, 1998). The customers would probably be supportive 
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to the same strategy since the impact on prices will be very high. The first vision is the one 
advocated by scientists, civil servants from governmental organizations and politicians.  
 
In a recent article, Chanaron & Duymedjian (2004) suggested the following stakeholders’ 
responsibility for automotive software: 
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Figure 9. Automobile software development and up-grading 
 
There is obviously a substantial impact of ITS-related devices on vehicle prices. 
 
Table 3. Prices in Yen of ITS devices form the Toyota Crown Majesta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is still high uncertainty to be resolved prior to volume diffusion: customer acceptance for 
such price differential? Technical standardization and at which level (national, continental or 
worldwide? What about the cost of up-dating and up-grading of software? Which level and 
rythm for economies of scale? Which legal responsibility and liability in case of failure? 
 
The automotive system is also suffering from the telephone syndrome. The positive impact of 
vehicle driving assistance devices on safety records will be long to be visible since it will 
probably follow the traditional diffusion trajectory. 
 
System Price Yen Price €
Average Price 
Vehicle
% Price
Lane Keeping Assisiatnce 210 000 158 6 000 000 3,5%
Intelligent Cruise Control 178 500 134 6 000 000 3,0%
Night Vision 315 000 236 6 000 000 5,3%
Intelligent Parking Assistance 241 000 181 6 000 000 4,0%
Early Accident Warning System 283 500 213 6 000 000 4,7%
Total 1 228 000 921 6 000 000 20,5%
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• 1st step: Optional equipment
• 2nd step: Original equipment on top-of-the-range 
models
• 3rd step: Extension to top middle-sized
• 4th step: Extension to bottom middle-sized
• 5th strep: Generalization
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Figure 10. The telephone syndrome 
 
Providing such crucial econmic questions would have been positively answered in the future, 
other uncertainties might bring new challenges into the picture such as psychological and 
sociological acceptance. Lewin (2005) recently pointed out the reluctance of buyers for 
exclusively electronically-based safety devices, i.e. drive-by-wire systems such as brake-by-wire 
and steering-by-wire
15
, requested anyway for future deployment of in-vehicle driving assistance 
systems.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In no way does this paper claim to be exhaustive. Neither does it refer to literature on recent 
microeconomic theory —work on game theory, in particular
16
— or experimental economics
17
, 
which provide numerous analyses of price determination in situations of imperfect competition 
and competitive oligopolies. 
 
It places particular emphasis on the concepts and notions used to support, or justify, the strategic 
decisions made by companies, and mirrors the ideas put forward by Smith and Nagle (1994), 
which infer that pricing decisions are, more often than not, of a “political” nature, which 
implicitly assumes that no mechanical model for the calculation of the ideal price actually exists. 
                                               
15
 The OEM having to maintain in parallel a direct mechanical control over the function. 
16
 See, for example, Choumette and Colard (1997) and ENSMP (2001). For a simple presentation of the applications 
to price theory, see the special reports by Les Echos magazine entitled “L’art de la stratégie” (The Art of Strategy), 
issues 3 and 4, in particular the articles by Garicano and Garicano and Gertner.  
17
 See, for example, Capra, Goeree, Gomez, Holt, (2000) and Roth (1993). One of the major developments of 
contemporary experimental economics is the emergence of a new field, dubbed “design economics”, which deals 
with the design of markets and the creation of markets through simulation (Roth, 2001). 
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The pricing of a new product or service is clearly a strategic decision, but it is also a highly 
complex issue. 
 
The analysis of two real cases of automotive innovation —ABS and navigation systems— 
proves the existence of a strong correlation between price and sales volume. What it does not do 
is provide a formula or even a vague method for determining “acceptable” price levels or 
“trigger points”. In addition, state intervention in the automotive sector can often play a decisive 
role —subsidies, tax breaks—thus causing an artificial drop in the launch price and therefore 
accelerating an innovation’s success. 
 
The framework developed on pricing and business models for in-vehicle driving assistance 
systems helps understanding innovation strategies. There are two options: “breakthrough” or 
disruptive innovation which is by essence very risky abd completely out of automobile industry 
history; or “incremental innovation” with each major model renewal. 
 
Such options exclude obviously the possibility of a radically new “entrant”, i.e. an innovation 
introduced by another industry. It is worth pinpointing that to date there is a consensus amongst 
experts that such a third way has very little chance to occur. In any case, innovation would 
probably come from risk taking stakeholders, with long termism strategies, sustainable resources 
and commitment to research and development. 
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